15 ideas
7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |