14 ideas
13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |