17 ideas
| 22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
| 2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
| 2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
| 22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
| 22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
| 22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
| 22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
| 22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
| 22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
| 22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
| 22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |