Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' and 'Introspection'

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10 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
5691 The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9312 Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
9313 Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
9315 Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
9316 How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9314 Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5687 For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
5688 Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]