Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the analysis of moral judgements', 'Carnap and Logical Truth' and 'Occasions of Identity'

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20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13010 In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
9002 Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13681 Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
13829 If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9003 Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
9004 If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
13437 A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
9001 Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9005 Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
6968 Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer]
6972 A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
6973 Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer]
6974 Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6971 I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6969 Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
6970 Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]