35 ideas
| 21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
| 21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
| 21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
| 21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
| 21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
| 21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
| 17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
| 21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
| 21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
| 21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
| 21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
| 17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
| 17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
| 21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
| 22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
| 21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
| 21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
| 17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
| 21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
| 17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
| 21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
| 17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
| 21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
| 17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
| 21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
| 21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
| 17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
| 6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
| 17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
| 17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
| 17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
| 5470 | The idea of laws of nature arose in the Middle Ages [Hall,AR, by Ellis] |
| 17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |
| 21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |