18 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
16648 | Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus] |
15386 | If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
15387 | If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
16632 | We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
13094 | The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16770 | It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus] |
10919 | What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
16768 | Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |