18 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |