19 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |