15 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| 7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
| 7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
| 7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
| 7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
| 7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
| 7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
| 7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |