59 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
18074 | Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
6298 | Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik] |
12392 | Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher] |
18078 | The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher] |
12426 | The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher] |
12395 | Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher] |
12425 | Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher] |
18071 | A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher] |
18066 | The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher] |
18083 | With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
18061 | Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher] |
12420 | If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher] |
12393 | Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher] |
12387 | Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher] |
12412 | My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher] |
18065 | We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher] |
18077 | The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher] |
12423 | Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher] |
18069 | Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher] |
18068 | Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher] |
18070 | We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher] |
18072 | Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher] |
18063 | Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher] |
18064 | If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
18067 | Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
12390 | A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher] |
12418 | In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher] |
12389 | Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher] |
12416 | We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher] |
12413 | A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher] |
20473 | If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
18075 | Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |