16 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |