16 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |