12 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
21862 | Consciousness is based on 'I can', not on 'I think' [Merleau-Ponty] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
20750 | The mind does not unite perceptions, because they flow into one another [Merleau-Ponty] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |