18 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |