15 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
| 3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
| 3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |