59 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
4938 | Prior to language, concepts are universals created by self-mapping of brain activity [Edelman/Tononi] |
16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
4934 | Cultures have a common core of colour naming, based on three axes of colour pairs [Edelman/Tononi] |
4924 | A conscious human being rapidly reunifies its mind after any damage to the brain [Edelman/Tononi] |
4932 | A conscious state endures for about 100 milliseconds, known as the 'specious present' [Edelman/Tononi] |
4931 | Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi] |
4923 | The three essentials of conscious experience are privateness, unity and informativeness [Edelman/Tononi] |
4941 | Consciousness can create new axioms, but computers can't do that [Edelman/Tononi] |
4930 | Consciousness arises from high speed interactions between clusters of neurons [Edelman/Tononi] |
4929 | Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi] |
4940 | Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals [Edelman/Tononi] |
4935 | The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi] |
4936 | The self is founded on bodily awareness centred in the brain stem [Edelman/Tononi] |
4939 | A sense of self begins either internally, or externally through language and society [Edelman/Tononi] |
4925 | Brains can initiate free actions before the person is aware of their own decision [Edelman/Tononi] |
4933 | Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes [Edelman/Tononi] |
18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
4928 | Brain complexity balances segregation and integration, like a good team of specialists [Edelman/Tononi] |
4927 | Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes [Edelman/Tononi] |
16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
4922 | Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi] |
16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
5793 | Concepts and generalisations result from brain 'global mapping' by 'reentry' [Edelman/Tononi, by Searle] |
4926 | Concepts arise when the brain maps its own activities [Edelman/Tononi] |
16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
4937 | Systems that generate a sense of value are basic to the primitive brain [Edelman/Tononi] |