9 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
9616 | A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor] |
15896 | Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |