11 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 9616 | A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor] |
| 15896 | Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |