13 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
9616 | A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor] |
15896 | Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |