Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Identity' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]