15 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| 8964 | Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
| 14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
| 14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
| 14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
| 14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
| 14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
| 14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
| 14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
| 14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
| 8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 8961 | Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 8963 | Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |