11 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| 14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
| 14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
| 14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
| 14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
| 14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| 9073 | Abstraction from an ambiguous concept like 'mole' will define them as the same [Barnes,J] |
| 9074 | Abstraction cannot produce the concept of a 'game', as there is no one common feature [Barnes,J] |
| 9072 | Defining concepts by abstractions will collect together far too many attributes from entities [Barnes,J] |
| 14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |