Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'First-Order Modal Logic' and 'Against Liberalism'

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84 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
21959 Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
9738 Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / a. Symbols of ML
9727 Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9726 We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9737 The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13136 The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
13727 A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9734 Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9736 A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9735 A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9741 Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / c. Derivation rules of ML
13141 Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13138 Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13142 Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13144 T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13145 D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13146 B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13147 4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13148 4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9740 If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9739 If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13137 Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13140 Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13139 Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13143 Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13149 S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
9742 The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
13114 □P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9743 The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
9744 The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / e. System K4
9746 The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
9745 The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
9747 The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
9748 System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9404 Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
13112 In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13111 Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
13113 F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
13728 The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13729 The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
9725 'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
13730 The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13725 □ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13731 Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
13726 Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21958 Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
23101 Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
23086 Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes]
23100 Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
23093 Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
23096 Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
23087 Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
23098 Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
23089 Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
23094 Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
23095 Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23090 Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
23117 Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
23119 Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
23088 Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23097 What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
23099 It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
23118 Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
23109 The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
23114 The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
23116 Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
23103 Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
23107 Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
23081 Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
23085 The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes]
23092 Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
23102 Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
23084 Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
23079 Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes]
23091 Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes]
23112 Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes]
23082 Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
23106 To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes]
23121 It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
23105 It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes]
23120 The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
23108 Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
23083 Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
23113 Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes]