26 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |