Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Knowledge by Agreement' and 'The Theory of Communicative Action'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch]
Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch]
Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch]
Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch]
Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch]
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch]
Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch]
Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch]
Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch]