34 ideas
2956 | There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood] |
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
2963 | There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood] |
2958 | No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood] |
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
2959 | If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
2969 | How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
2970 | Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
2961 | Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
2960 | Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood] |
2952 | A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood] |
2964 | How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood] |
2951 | Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood] |
2953 | Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood] |
2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
2966 | Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood] |
2955 | If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood] |
2950 | Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood] |
2954 | Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
2971 | Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
2962 | Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood] |
2949 | We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood] |