15 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| 23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
| 23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
| 23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
| 23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
| 23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |