Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' and 'Universal Prescriptivism'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M]
To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M]
Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]