Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Mental Content' and 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]