18 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |