Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Travels in Four Dimensions' and 'The Gay (Joyful) Science'

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65 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin]
It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche]
Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche]
Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]
Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche]