16 ideas
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| 17879 | Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem] |
| 15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
| 17878 | If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem] |
| 17880 | Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem] |
| 17881 | Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem] |
| 15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
| 15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
| 15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
| 15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
| 15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
| 15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| 15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |