19 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |