Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mereology', 'Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences' and 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)'

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]