19 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
19480 | Process philosophy places the dynamic nature of being at the centre of our theories [Seibt] |
19479 | Reductionists identify processes by their 'owner', but tornadoes etc. are processes without owners [Seibt] |
19481 | Traditionally small things add up to processes, but quantum mechanics reverses this [Seibt] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |