Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mereology', 'The Analysis of Matter' and 'Process Philosophy'

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19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Process philosophy places the dynamic nature of being at the centre of our theories [Seibt]
Reductionists identify processes by their 'owner', but tornadoes etc. are processes without owners [Seibt]
Traditionally small things add up to processes, but quantum mechanics reverses this [Seibt]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B]