21 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |