Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mereology', 'Statements about Universals' and 'What are Sets and What are they For?'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley]
We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley]
The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley]
Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley]
We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]