38 ideas
| 21406 | Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant] |
| 4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
| 10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
| 10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
| 10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
| 10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
| 10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
| 10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
| 10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
| 10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
| 10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
| 10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
| 4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
| 10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
| 4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
| 4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
| 21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
| 4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
| 4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
| 4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
| 4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
| 4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
| 4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
| 21082 | A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant] |
| 21089 | Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant] |
| 21086 | Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant] |
| 21080 | Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant] |
| 21083 | Women have no role in politics [Kant] |
| 21407 | Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant] |
| 21084 | In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant] |
| 21090 | If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant] |
| 21087 | Human life is pointless without justice [Kant] |
| 21088 | Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant] |
| 21085 | The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant] |