Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mereology', 'Moral Relativism' and 'Elbow Room: varieties of free will'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
3798 An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
3801 Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10653 Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10648 Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
10655 Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
10659 There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10661 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10647 Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
10651 If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
10649 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
10654 The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10658 Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
10652 Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
3802 Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
22449 When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3795 Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
3797 I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3800 You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
3803 Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
3791 Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
3794 Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3796 The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22451 All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
22452 Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]