Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mereology', 'Human Freedom and the Self' and 'The Nature of Judgement'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
6405 Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
7527 Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10653 Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10648 Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
10655 Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
10659 There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10661 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10647 Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
10651 If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
10649 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
10654 The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10658 Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
10652 Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3444 If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
3446 For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm]
9268 If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
22302 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
7526 Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
3442 Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm]
3443 Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
3445 Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]