22 ideas
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |