Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference' and 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

28 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
16539 A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
16540 Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
16548 An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
16549 Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
13373 Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / b. König's paradox
13368 The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
13370 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
13369 By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
13366 The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
13367 The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
13371 If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G]
13372 There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16545 The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
16546 The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
16542 Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
16552 If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
16533 Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
16531 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
16532 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
16543 If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
16544 Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
16538 We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
16534 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
3448 Do new ideas increase the weight of the brain? [Dance]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16535 A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
16550 Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
16547 H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]