29 ideas
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
3448 | Do new ideas increase the weight of the brain? [Dance] |
17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |