Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essential vs Accidental Properties', 'Some Judgements of Perception' and 'Our Knowledge of the External World'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
21584 A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
21572 Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21571 Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
21574 Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
21587 Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
21582 Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
21573 When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
21588 Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
21586 The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
21585 The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
21684 Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
22316 A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21576 With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21575 When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
10939 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
10933 Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
10932 If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
20147 Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
21580 Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
21583 When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
21577 Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21579 Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
21578 Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
6416 Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
21581 We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]