22 ideas
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |