Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'The Reasons of Love' and 'Laws in Nature'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]