Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'Tarski's Theory of Truth' and 'Virtues of the Mind'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski]
Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski]
A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski]
Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski]
We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski]
A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski]
A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski]
Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG]
Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski]
Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski]