42 ideas
| 1813 | All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1811 | Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1815 | Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1812 | All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| 8850 | Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M] |
| 1814 | Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
| 23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
| 23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
| 23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
| 23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
| 23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
| 23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
| 23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
| 23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
| 23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
| 23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
| 23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
| 23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
| 23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
| 23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
| 23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
| 23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
| 23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
| 23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
| 23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
| 23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
| 23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
| 23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
| 23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |