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All the ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses'

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33 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid]